An academic affair : Japan - Thailand

`Is it good that I had this much fun?' CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT -Yoneo Ishii presenting his five-volume `The Computer Concordance to the Law of the Three Seals' to HRH Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn - as a monk at Wat Bowon Niwet -translating for prime ministers Sarit Thanarat and Hayato Ikeda -at home in Thailand -doing field research -with Professor Hideo Kobayashi, to whom Ishii attributes his discovery of Thailand since Kobayashi suggested Ishii take up a little-known Asian language -more field research.

Japan's foremost Thai scholar Yoneo Ishii discusses his long relationship with the Kingdom

STORY BY VASANA CHINVARAKORN, PHOTO BY KARIN KLINKAJORN

Yoneo Ishii

The story of their friendship is extraordinary, unprecedented and loaded with repercussions for the years that followed. Due to the proximity of their abodes, the two men were likely to have met almost every day. Their exchanges would probably have covered a wide range of topics - from language and culture to politics, science and spiritual beliefs - but both remained firmly in their respective creeds: The Siamese monarch in Theravada Buddhism and the French Catholic priest in Christianity. At any rate, during the years they knew each other the first stage of Siam's modernisation was set in motion.

Now in his late seventies, Japanese scholar Yoneo Ishii finds the above cross-cultural relationship between King Mongkut (1804-1868) and Bishop Jean-Baptiste Pallegoix (1805-1862) so intriguing that he wants to write a book about it. If completed, that book will add to the vast corpus he has already produced in his prolific academic career that has run for over half a century. Considered the doyen of Thai studies in Japan, Professor Ishii has commanded respect from generations of students from different disciplines and ideological camps. This should come as no surprise: Ishii is a truly learned man but one who is also full of humility and diplomacy when dealing with others.

But why take such an interest in the relationship between two people who died well over 100 years ago? Ishii's eyes brightened when he described his visit to Conception Church where Pallegoix resided and how he discovered it was less than 200m away from Wat Samor-rai (aka Wat Rachatiwat), which was King Mongkut's quarters during his monkhood prior to taking the throne. His enthusiasm is like the delight of a child piecing together a jigsaw. Only this game is intellectual. Ishii even went so far as to speculate that Pallegoix, who had a generous physique, would probably walk on foot when visiting his royal friend and avoid taking a row boat. The Japanese professor discussed at length how the more he researched the topic the more he marvelled at both King Mongkut's profound knowledge of Christianity and Pallegoix's amassing of 146 samut-khoi (traditional books) from the Kingdom, an exceptional feat considering the limited printing technology of the time and the restricted access a foreigner would have had to such books.

Ishii reckoned that two famous works by the French priest, a book on Thai grammar and the very first Thai dictionary, must have been written in large part with the private collaboration of King Mongkut himself.

"I don't know how many more years I have to live," said Ishii, speaking in Thai. "I'm 78 now. But if possible, I would like to write this book."

`Is it good that I had this much fun?' CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT -Yoneo Ishii presenting his five-volume `The Computer Concordance to the Law of the Three Seals' to HRH Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn - as a monk at Wat Bowon Niwet -translating for prime ministers Sarit Thanarat and Hayato Ikeda -at home in Thailand -doing field research -with Professor Hideo Kobayashi, to whom Ishii attributes his discovery of Thailand since Kobayashi suggested Ishii take up a little-known Asian language -more field research.

Ishii could be the only person capable of the task. His fluency in French, Latin, and Pali (among the 20-plus languages he has acquired) facilitated his reading of archival materials. This included browsing through Pallegoix's reports to the Societe des Missions Etrangeres (Missionaries Society) during a one-month stint in Paris. Ishii's acclaimed doctoral thesis, Sangha, State and Society - Thai Buddhism in History, which he wrote in the 1970s, already touched briefly on the ties between the two men. But the seeds of Ishii's curiosity were probably planted five decades ago when he spent three months as a monk at Wat Bowon Niwet, which is where King Mongkut first founded the Thammayut sect as part of his effort to reform Buddhism to withstand the influx of Western civilisation and beliefs.

Are these factors merely coincidences? Or have they been the schemes wrought benevolently by the Almighty up there? Ishii's academic career, recounted in the Thai translation of his autobiography Gueng Sattawat Bon Sentharng Thai Suksa (Half a Century of Thai Studies), tells of several twists and turns which, in the course of time, eventually fitted perfectly together. Ishii summed this up as "luck", writing "I even had to ask myself: 'Is it good that I had this much fun?' I think I am such a happy human to be able to discover what I find sanuk to do."

All this started from a simple passion: Languages. In his autobiography, the professor shares his recollections of growing up in postwar Japan. Unlike many of his contemporaries, the young Ishii did not have much concern for mundane matters like graduation or future employment. His sudden, rather haphazard, series of decisions to change fields were a rarity then as now. From a high-school major in science, he switched to take English language and literature in university then moved over to the French department. After a few years taking courses in numerous European languages he dropped out and took up Thai, which at the time he called pasa Siam, at another university. "It was all because of what one of my teachers said to me: That I should try to study an Asian language, one that few [Japanese] had yet to learn," he said. After studying Thai for one year Ishii sat for an exam at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hoping to get a chance to be posted to Thailand as an exchange student. Around two years later, on April 23, 1957, 27-year-old Ishii finally set foot in Thailand.

"I pressed my nose against the [aeroplane] window and peered hard," he writes in the opening chapter of Gueng Sattawat. "I could see it must be a water buffalo. It seemed to be dragging a plough behind, followed by a human. As the buffalo moved, so did the person. That must be a Thai. Is this a real living Thai person? When I finish my studies, I should be able to talk with these people.

"Hmm ... but will I really be able to speak Thai? Nay, I must be able to speak it! I have two full years. I will try my best."

And he did. The following years saw the eager young man enrol at Chulalongkorn University's Faculty of Arts (where he studied with the likes of Phya Anuman Rajadhon), take private Thai lessons with the late Khunying Kanitha Wichiancharoen, travel extensively throughout Indochina with two separate research teams and enter the monkhood at Wat Bowon Niwet. At the Japanese embassy, he was the interpreter for the historic meeting between Thai prime minister Sarit Thanarat and his Japanese counterpart, Hayato Ikeda, that resolved the thorny issue of the "special Yen loans" made by the Japanese government during World War Two. Ishii's linguistic skills pleased Sarit so much that he later made the unprecedented move of recommending Ishii for a royal decoration.

"It was a great honour. I was only a junior embassy staffer," said Ishii with a grin. "I think I am the second foreigner who earned it. I respect them both, Sarit and Ikeda, so I tried to do perhaps more than my usual duty as a translator. Later a friend told me: 'You are a very dangerous interpreter. An interpreter should be a kind of machine, not a person. So you are not a good interpreter!"'

The Japanese professor's capacity to grasp the essence of a language is second-to-none. To say the least, he is naturally gifted - and is renowned for dogged perseverance, too. His Japanese translation of Thongchai Winichakul's Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation earned him the Grand Prix Asia Pacific Award from Mainichi newspaper in 2004. Ishii said that, partly due to his busy schedule, he spent a total of six years on the translation and went through four revisions. Despite his trademark humbleness, he recommended, with an open laugh, that his Japanese translation might serve Japanese intellectuals better than the original English version.

Ishii described the Japanese language as a door to the world's knowledge. "Japan is virtually a translating country," he said, going on to date this trend to the Edo period when Japan's ruling elite initiated translations of major foreign works as a way to get themselves up-to-date with the outside world. The tradition carried on in the Meiji era, when Japan was forced to open itself, and has been there since.

Ishii's passion for Thai knowledge soon moved beyond language. In his acceptance speech for the prestigious Fukuoka Asian Cultural Prize in 1994, he described the unfolding of his love for Thailand:

"I first began learning Thai solely as a means to study linguistics. However, as I gradually deepened my bonds to Thailand, the language became a tool to understand the country itself.

"Although my research focus is Thailand, I decided to stop confining myself inside the limited methodological framework. Whether the focus is linguistics, religious study, sociology or historical research, we should use any means we can try and understand Thailand. This is my basic attitude. As a result, I had to cover extremely diverse fields of study."

The Japanese scholar's insights on Thailand may be deeper than those of many Thais. He has always had the determination to get to the very roots of things. In the same speech, Ishii explained his desire to enter the monkhood as a wish to "obtain clues to understand Thailand, to understand Buddhism as it is, rather than as it should be.

"The reason I entered the priesthood was that I wanted to experience Thai Buddhism as the Thai people do and understand it from within and eventually, feel it for itself. I put all my work together into my dissertation in 1975, 17 years after I entered the priesthood."

Ishii also has an awareness of inter-connectedness, an ability to look at issues in broad, comprehensive terms. At Kyoto University's Centre for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) where he worked for 25 years including five, from 1985 to 1990, as director, Ishii launched several outstanding inter-disciplinary research projects that propelled the institute to be recognised as a world leader in area studies. Among the works produced at this time is one that focuses on the culture and ecology of Thailand as a rice-growing society that inspired similar studies of other such communities. CSEAS pioneered having natural scientists work alongside social scientists, a process conducive to Ishii's belief that the heart of collaboration among intellectuals lies in the deceptively simple act of being able "to dine and drink together".

Initial distrust of CSEAS by the public and leftist students who viewed the organisation as a lackey for US imperialism in Asia (due to opposition to the Vietnam war and the fact that the centre's first sponsor was the Ford Foundation) eventually gave way to praise and admiration for its work. Meanwhile, although he never aimed to be someone who climbs for the top, Ishii's management skills have nonetheless been much sought after. In 1990, he was invited by Sophia University to be director of its Institute of Asian Cultures. Other offers poured in later, the Japanese professor being asked to hold, often at the same time, senior positions in different organisations. He has been director of the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies for Unesco (Tokyo), rector of Kanda University of International Studies, director of the Japan Centre for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan, and is presently president of the National Institutes for the Humanities (Nihu), an umbrella group of five Japanese research centres.

"I have done too many [jobs]," Ishii said, laughing. "This March, I plan to take off my biggest 'hat', at Nihu."

The amazing thing is that in the midst of all the administrative demands from his offices, Ishii has been able to keep producing quality research. His autobiography is inspiring largely because it is about motivations, and professor Ishii has plenty. He tells in the book of his private vow that even though other academics could spend 10 hours on their research and he could only spare 30 minutes, he would still keep up the effort. Even dust, he said, citing a Japanese saying, when accumulated over a long period of time could turn into a mountain. After all, this academic game of learning and testing new ideas is, for Ishii, extremely good fun.

So what does Ishii plan to do down the road? There is that book about King Mongkut and Pallegoix. Another interest is Ayutthaya, on which Ishii proposed a ground-breaking idea a few years ago recasting the kingdom as a cosmopolitan port polity to which maritime trade counted more than previously held. Ishii is even studying two more languages in order to pursue this self-assigned research project - Persian and that of the Cham ethnic group.

So does he ever think of relaxation?

"For me, what I like to do most is to study," he said. "I travel in my head. Each language is a world in itself. Whenever I learn new languages, it is like I have discovered another world. So when I, say, get bored with the Japanese world, I could slip into another one."

The Japanese scholar certainly has many "worlds" at his disposal.

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A scholar's insights on modern Thailand

Having followed Thai history for more than half a century, Yoneo Ishii believes the biggest turning point for Thailand is the period between October 14, 1973 and October 6, 1976.

"Many people usually refer to the 1932 revolution [as the key event]," he said. "But I believe the October 14 and October 6 are far more important. More Thai academics should seriously study this period - the time when there was a radical change in the mentality of Thai people, especially those of the younger generations. Thailand has progressed at the cost of the lives of students who sacrificed themselves for the good of the country.

"That [period] is what I consider to be the true revolution."

For Ishii, the proliferation of books - and ideas - in Thailand during the mid-1970s was a real breakthrough. It was a huge contrast to the lack of reading materials available to the public 50 or more years ago. As a student at Chulalongkorn University, the young Ishii was surprised to learn there was no philosophy class offered to undergraduates. But the curious man soon found solace in another pursuit - collecting "cremation volumes", the books distributed at a person's cremation containing information on the deceased's life as well as reprints of other pieces of writing, from a second-hand book market at Sanam Luang. At the end of his first seven years in Thailand, Ishii returned to Japan with 27 cartons of cremation volumes. Later, while at Kyoto University, he managed to acquire another 6,000 of the books from a Thai collector, making the library there the world's largest collection of these unique works.

Ishii went on to produce numerous quality pieces of research on Thailand, both independently and with teams of co-researchers. Among them are the classics Sangha, State and Society - Thai Buddhism in History and Thailand: A Rice-Growing Society, the comprehensive five-volume The Computer Concordance to the Law of the Three Seals, and The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translation from the Tosen Fusetsu-gaki, 1674-1723.

A pity that most of Ishii's works have yet to be translated into Thai, for they are critical, well-researched and, despite the passage of time, continue to be relevant to understanding this country and its people. Sangha, State and Society, for example, contains several revealing passages such as:

"The modernisation of Thailand, planned and executed by the ruling classes, had as its aim the entrenchment of their privileged position by rationalising the enforcement of their authority. The masses were constantly excluded from the process and, consequently, even up to recent times, never acquired a sense of modern citizenship. Even the Constitutional Revolution [in 1932] was in essence a court revolution, for the reform of the polity it brought failed to alter fundamentally the relationship between ruler and ruled. For the vast majority of the Thai people, it was no more than an exchange of royal absolutism or an oligarchy of princes for military oligarchy.

"In these circumstances, Thai nationalism lacked the dynamics to reject the privileged ruling class that was traditionally its bearer. Ultimately, the People's Party which toppled the absolute monarchy had to seek political legitimacy in recognition by the king. This situation, moreover, has been repeated after each of the coups d'etats in the series that reaches to the present day."

So what does Ishii think of the bilateral relationship between his homeland and his adopted second home, both of which are now indispensable partners in the global economic arena? After laughing when he recalled his Chula classmates expressing surprise at Japan's ability to manufacture watches and cars, Ishii pointed out that tuk-tuks were adapted from Japanese delivery trucks! Also, he reckoned that it must be extremely difficult to find a taxi in Thailand that is not of Japanese make.

And how about Thailand exerting influence on Japan?

"The term tom yum gung has now entered the Japanese lexicon!" was Ishii's succinct reply.

The Japanese scholar raised concerns, though, about putting too much emphasis on the economics over everything else. Quite diplomatically, Ishii declined to comment on the controversy over the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership agreement, saying he has not been following the issue, but said that friendship and trust between individuals in one nation and those in another must be the bedrock of true "international exchange". After all, he said, underneath the differences, all of us are humans who should try to understand one another.

Source : Thursday February 28, 2008

THAKSIN'S BOISTEROUS HOMECOMING

THAKSIN'S BOISTEROUS HOMECOMING

"I definitely stay out of politics" : Thaksin

Our Political Desk will be with you until Thaksin Shinawatra goes to bed in Thailand for the first time since September, 2006. He must be feeling very strange. We are.

2:19 pm: Thaksin starts speaking at his press conference.
During the conference, he vows to stay out of politics and apologised to the people for their hardship caused by his involvement in the political conflict."I and my family have suffered from injustice but this can not be compared to the hardship befallen the people who are the worst victims of political rivalry," he says.Thaksin says it is normal for politicians to having ties with him as this is part of Thai culture but should not be construed as his political comeback.He wants to return to his homeland since September 20, a day after the power seizure but he was asked by coup leaders to stay in exil for a while. This happened to last almost 18 months, he says.Following the restoration of democratic rule, he says he is obliged to come back to defend his tarnished reputation and that of his family.He says he is saddened by injustice, vowing to rebut his graft charges and prove his innocence.

2.10pm : Thaksin arrives at the Penninsula Hotel to hold press conference.

12.30pm : Thaksin holds a closed door meeting with his aides at his Chan Song La residence before attending the press conference which has been rescheduled from 1 pm to 2.30 pm.He is slated to stay at Peninsula Hotel for safety reason. He has booked 11 rooms on Floor 33 to 35, costing Bt106.000 per room per day.

12.10pm : Thaksin emerged smiling from the Office of the Attorney General following the completion of his successful bail review. He was granted temporary release on the SC Asset case.Thaksin is travelling to the Peninsula Hotel for a scheduled press conference at 1 pm.

11.55am : Thaksin was seen arriving at the Office of the Attorney General.Department of Special Investigation acting director general Thawee Sodsong was on hand to notify his charges relating to the SC Asset case.After notifyin his charges, Thawee would hand over Thaksin to the custody of public prosecutors. Thaksin is then expected to submit his bail application.The Nation

11.53am : Thaksin stopped by at the headquarters of the Crime Suppression Division at 11.00 am on his way for bail review at the Office of the Attorney General.He was accompanied by Interior Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung and three children, Panthongtae, Paethongtan and Pinthongta.He reportedly had a brief rest before his scheduled appointment with public prosecutors.He resumes his journey at 11.40 am.

11.50am : Chiang Mai authorities are in full gear to welcome native son Thaksin Shinawatra who might return to his hometown to greet supporters on Friday.Thousands of supporters have already started rallying on Thursday ahead of Thaksin's anticipated return.

11.50am : Thaksin leaves the court house after the Court grants him a Bt8-million bail.

10.40am : Thaksin's lawyer Pichit Chuenban is applying for Thaksin's bail upon his client's arrival at the Supreme Court building for bail review.Thaksin Shinwatra is expected to apply for his temporary release before noon. His youngest daughter Pinthongta is slated to act as bondswoman.During the review, Thaksin would be held in the court's custody at a defence room. The bail process should take about one hour.

10.30am : Thaksin arrives at the Supreme Court where he will learn of the charges and request to be released on bail.

10.20 am: TPBS reported that Chiang Mai residents who gathered to watch the moment on TV were in tears.

One TPBS announcer reminds the audience that the touching moments aside, Thaksin now will "walk straight into reality" _ the fight against corruption charges to prove himself.

10.10 am: Thaksin has come out of the VIP room to greet his supporters with a humble Thai "wai". It takes less than. It's very low-key by anyone's standard. It seems to be a well thought-out way of greeting, if there's nothing more, that is. But it seems he will not come back out.
Meanwhile, additional TV footage just showed that once he got off the VIP room, he prostrated on the ground to pay utmost respect to the motherland. Then he "wai" his supporters and waved at them. The whole scenario from leaving the VIP room and greeting the crowds lasted less than five minutes.Tears were brimming in his eyes. TV stations are rerunning the ground-worshipping moment.

9.50 am: He has entered VIP room number 3 at the airport. TPBS reports that he would soon spend around 15 minutes greeting his supporters before heading to the Supreme Court.Interior Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung and Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama are among senior government figures to greet him.Thaksin spent about half an hour with his family members inside the airport's VIP Room No 3.His wife Khunying Pojaman and their daughter Paethongtan were waiting to welcome him. His son Panthongtae accompanied him on the flight back from Hong Kong.His youngest daughter Pinthongta was at the court building to arrange for bail review.After greeting his family members, Thaksin met with a senior monk from Chiang Mai, his hometown. Phra Khru Suthep Sitthikhun of Wat Sribunruang presented him with a wooden Buddha statuette.Afterward, he talked to his close allies, including Sudarat Keyuraphan, Chidchai Vanastidya, Phrommin Lertsuridej, Pongthep Thepkanchan and his cousin and former Army chief General Chaisit Shinawatra.Five Cabinet members were also present. They are Interior Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung, Deputy Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, Transport Minister Santi Prompat, his deputy Songsak Thongsri and PM's Office Minister Jakrapob Penkair.

9.40 am: Thaksin has landed.

9.30 am: TV Channel 9 ends a news break with local singer Christina's popular oldie: "My Heart Asks for It". Coupled with old Thaksin footages, it must be very touching for Thaksin's supporters. As for the other camp, yes, it can be one looooong day.

9.20am : Interior Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung says he would personally escort former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra from Suvarnabhumit Airport to the Supreme Court building for bail review.
Chalerm was confident that there would be no eruption of violence, playing down concern about possible assassination attempt.
"I don't think there will any assassination like what happened abroad and I trust in the security system and officials responsible for implementation," he said.
He said Thaksin would stay at the Peninsula Hotel instead of his Chan Song La residence which is undergoing a renovation.

9.10 am: Hundreds of taxi motorcyclists, who had gathered on Lard Prao Road, were allowed to go through security the Suvarnabhumi Airport to join around 3,000 of waiting Thaksin supporters.
There are all kinds of welcome-home banners carried by the supporters. One stands out: "Real Gem is Coming Home."

7 am (Bkk time): Ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has boarded a Thai Airways plane in Hong Kong to return to Bangkok for the first time in 17 months after he was toppled.
He insisted again he was going home to defend himself against unfair accusations and would stay out of politics. Lots of flowers from Thais at the airport, but that is nothing compared to what awaits him at the Thai international airport.
Thaksin told reporters that he was confident of his innocence and was ready to prove he had done nothing wrong. He said he would report to the authorities on his arrival.
He is dressed in black suit with black tie.

Another man in the focus, Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, said he welcomed Thaksin's return. But what else could he have said, honestly?

"It's normal that he must defend himself in the court and my government will not interfere," Samak said.

Best quote so far is from Thaksin: "Democracy returned to Thailand. So, it is time for those who are democratic advocates to go back."
The first thing he wishes to do is to hug his wife and children.

Good morning everyone. It can be another long day for Thai politics, but we have gone through many, have we?


Source : the Nation, February 28, 2008

THAKSIN'S RETURN

THAKSIN'S RETURN

Thaksin kisses grounds upon arrival
Ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra kisses the grounds upon arrival at the airport.

Photo of the Day

A billboard near the Sathupradit-Rama III expressway reads ‘Welcoming former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra back home. From Bangkok residents’. Thaksin is expected to arrive by air today.


Source : the Nation,February 28,2008

Stateless Peoples

A Keynote address at the Southeast Asian Studies’ seminar on

“Lives of the Stateless Peoples and Unidentified nationalities”

At Sriburapha Auditorium, Thammasat University, Bangkok.
22 February 2008

Stateless Peoples

By

Professor Benedict AndersonCornell University

Let me begin my remarks today with a few words about the global place of Thailand along two simple axes. In terms of geographic spread, the country ranks as Number 49 out of the roughly 200 generally recognized independent states, i.e. at the bottom of the leading 25%. Slightly bigger than Spain, slightly smaller than France. A lot smaller than Texas, but a lot bigger than New Mexico. In terms of population it ranks much higher, i.e. Number 19, or within the leading 10%, just above France.

Like all the states above it, and also like most of the states below it, Thailand’s population includes many ethnolinguistic and religious groups. You could also say that by combining the two axes, Thailand comes out as a reasonably important middle-range nation-state.

If the above information will not be a surprise to you, I would like to offer you another kind of picture, so that we can consider the question of ‘peoples without states’ in a broad context. Out of the roughly 200 states mentioned above, no less than 61, or about 30%, have populations less than 3 million, a figure substantially less than half of the population of Krung Thep Maha Narok. 34 states have less than a million people, and 15 have less than 100,000. What kind of entities are these microstates? Many are small islands in the Caribbean, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian, and the Pacific oceans, and can be said to be products of European imperialism and colonialism. But there also plenty in Europe itself, mostly relics from the feudal era. With the exception of the European and Persian Gulf cases, these states are poor, vastly dependent on outside aid, and relying for survival on tourism, and, in some cases on banks which specialize in hiding the wealth of the world’s richest people who are eager to avoid being taxed at home. How many of them are really ‘nations’ is also a serious question, so that one might also think of them as ‘states without nations.’

I bring this material to your attention for three reasons. The first is to remind you that it is quite possible for ‘ very small peoples’ to gain states and thus the status of ‘nation-states’ and have seats in the United Nations. So that the ambition of some stateless people to have their own states is not at all irrational, though it usually very risky and lead to much loss of life. The second is to underline the fact that most such microstates are doomed to perpetual dependence on foreign aid, foreign tourists, and foreign tax-evaders in order to survive. The third is that there is no reason to suppose that the rulers of such states will automatically behave well towards their own peoples. By my rough estimate, only about two thirds of them can be said to be reasonably democratic. So the question of peoples without states should be discussed without sentimentality, and in a global-historical context.

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The next question that we should be thinking about is what we mean by ‘peoples without states.’ In some obvious ways, we should realize that they do not really exist any more today. If we look, for example, at our own region, Southeast Asia, as recently as the end of World War Two there were still substantial areas which were essentially stateless. We could include here the vast, largely unknown mountainous terrain of West Papua, held weakly by Dutch colonialism until 1962, and then transferred formally to Indonesia without any local peoples’ consent. We could also include a huge mountainous belt comprising parts of northern Burma, even parts of Thailand, as well as northern Laos and Northwestern Vietnam. Occupied by nomad and sedentary ‘hilltribes,’ which were part of post-colonial Burma, Laos and Vietnam in atlases, in every day reality they were little touched by these states. Part of Thailand itself was essentially controlled not by Bangkok but residual Kuomintang warlords. But over the last sixty years the real autonomy of these hilltribes has drastically declined as a result of state expansion, the spread of capitalism, and in many cases long and bloody wars.

It is also worth asking ourselves when and how these and other comparable groups came to be thought of as ‘peoples.’ We know that for centuries Spanish colonialists referred to the various Muslim groups in Mindanao and Sulu as ‘Moros,’ the Spanish word for the Moors, originally meaning Catholic Spain’s Muslim enemies along the north shore of the Mediterranean. But it was only in the 1970s that these peoples began to call themselves, without irony, the bangsa Moro, or Moro People. We know that while for centuries Dutch colonialists called all the immigrants from Southeast China, and their descendants, “Chinese,” these people, mostly illiterate, speaking mutually unintelligible Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, and Hainanese, did not think of themslves as ‘Chinese” till the 1890s. Up till more or the less the same time, the ruling class of Siam spoke of Hor (arriving by land) and Jek (arriving by sea) as if they were different peoples. The East Timorese, composed of at least 14 social groups speaking mutually unintelligible languages , only became a people in the late 1960s. A nice illustration of this problem comes to us from British India. When the authorities finally had the power to hold a census in remote Buddhist Ladakh, in the 1920s, they made the mistake of asking the local people “who they were,” and received over 300 different replies, (including I am a trader, I am a monk, I belong to Clan X or Y, I am a Shia, I am a widow,and I moved here ten years ago.) Annoyed by this multitude, for the next census the British decided on 30 or so categories of their own, and forced the locals to belong to one or another of them. So there is plenty of evidence for the old idea that it is commonly not peoples who create states, but states that create peoples. This most likely is how in fairly recent times ‘peoples’ like the Hmong, Lisu, Yao, Karen and so forth have gradually learned to see themselves as peoples. People in Bangkok usually speak of the Far South, as the violent place of Malay-speaking Muslims. It is possible that in the end they call into being just such a ‘people.’ But not yet, because the locals in Satun are not violent, and still do not share a common imagined identity with those of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.

This phenomenon - which we can all the gap between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ identity – is, in different forms, visible everywhere. If I ask someone in Bangkok where she is from, she will not say from Thailand, but rather ‘Songkhla or Isan,’ but if I meet her in Singapore she will say I am from Thailand; and if we in meet in Chicago, she might easily say I am from Asia, if she thinks I have never heard of Thailand.

The point of all this is to remind ourselves that the identities of peoples are historical, relational, and imagined, not essential and unchanging. One must always ask oneself, when did states start to imagine a group which it called, or better, named, a people. When did people start to take over this imagining? In ways does this imagining depend on who asks the question: Who are you? Always the most important questioner is the state. This applies just as much to ‘the Thai people’ as to any other.

3

One can, at least in theory, make practical distinctions between different kinds of peoples without states, even if this title is, as I suggested earlier, actually out of date. Meuang Thai offers some good examples of the three commonest types. One group consists of peoples who in theory have real national states, but these states lie outside Thailand’s borders. The obvious examples are the Khmer-speakers north of the Dongrak chain, especially in Buriram, Surin, and Sisaket, who are perfectly aware of the Khmer nation-state south of the mountains; or the Lao-speaking people on the west bank of the Mae Khong, who can see Prathet Lao on the opposite side of the river. A second group consists of peoples who believe they once had a state of their own, but have long been deprived of it. In the far South, facing the Gulf of Siam, the memory of the Keradjaan of Old Pattani is quite strong, since it was abolished by R V only a century or so ago. Northerners have comparable memories of Old Chiangmai, even if they do not wish to remember too clearly two centuries of quiet life as part of the Burmese empire, and a notable if secondary role in the destruction of Ayuthaya. Perhaps one should think of the Jin in the same way. The Mon are a hybrid case, since the great Mon kingdom of the past lay in today’s Southern Burma, where even today the majority of Mon actually live. The third group consists mainly of hilltribes and the Chao Le, who probably never had real states of their own. Each of these distinct groups is ‘stateless’ in a quite different sense, and to think about them one has to keep these differences clearly in mind.

Group l. In the cases of Northern and Southern Isan, it does not seem to me that any very serious problems arise today (though Isan in the 1950s and 1960s was another matter). In all the regions, the institution of universal adult suffrage, unsteady democratization up to a point, the rapid spread of educational institutions up to the tertiary levels in almost all provinces, the successful spread of developmental capitalism, and the ease of internal migration, has created conditions in which these ‘peoples’ have a strong stake in the existing order, or useful lack of order one might say. Powerful veteran politicians like Newin Chidchob and Sanoh Thianthong campaign locally in Khmer but address the parliament in Bangkok Thai. The same could be said for powerful Lao-speaking politicians from the upper Northeast.. Enormous numbers of Lao-speakers have been migrating to Bangkok and all over the rest of the country. Educational expansion has given more opportunities for ambitious people from these regions to create successful businesses and enter the national bureaucracy and military. Isan also has the very large numbers to make an Isan bloc in parliament as serious matter. Beyond that, if they look across the borders at Laos and Cambodia, they see countries enormously poorer, with authoritarian regimes, and no obvious futures for Isaners themselves. Much the same is true of the lukjin who are pervasive in the middle class in Bangkok and upcountry, and feel they are doing very well. The rapid rise of China to world-power also gives them security for the long-term future. What all these groups may want is mostly something that Bangkok can easily give if it wishes, cultural acknowledgment, less contempt, more room for ‘ethnic’ selfcultivation and autonomy. Real political power, of course, is another matter, as we have seen over the past 5 years.

Group. 2 The three cases have some things in common, but they are also quite distinct. Although in some ways the “khon meuang” often feel that they are a people with their own distinct history and culture, the absorption of Chiangmai into the Bangkok state was not terribly violent, and, up to a point, this distinctiveness is acknowledged by that state. The descendants of the old jao are still there, even if they do not matter much. The region is prosperous and Chiangmai is the country’s second city. Access to national-level institutions has been growing, and Thaksin’s rise to power brought a Northerner to the national Prime Ministership for the first time. One does not get the impression that there is a real problem for another reason, which is that the language of the North is not very distant from Central Thai, and has obvious affinities with the vernacular of Isan. One might even say that the base of the Thaksin regime’s electoral power has been exactly a coalition of the North and the Northeast. Thailand’s Mon have long intermarried with Central Thai and Chinese, and they are quite aware of their contributions to ‘national’ music and the plastic arts. But they are also aware that they have life a good deal better in Thailand than than their cousins in Burma (rather like the Khmers in Surin), and, so far as I can tell, do not spend much time thinking about the grand medieval Kingdom in the Irrawaddy delta. Yet their numbers are too few, and their grip on the Mon language is today too weak, to create a serious regional block, like the North and Isan.

The Muslims Malays of Old Pattani are, as we are well aware, a completely different story. In the days of the old Thai imperial monarchy, they were periodically suppressed by force of arms, and compelled to accept the distant Thai rulers as suzerains. But the lower Chao Phraya flatland state itself was too primitive and ramshackle to do much more than exact tribute and carry away populations, so that Old Pattani was largely left alone till the times of Rama V, and his competitive horse-trading with the expanding British Empire. Unlike Satun, which for its own reasons cooperated with Bangkok, Old Pattani came to be ruled by officials from Bangkok, who despised everything about the place and the people. They were Sunni Muslims, unlike the mainly Shia Muslims of Central Thai, long accommodated by the state. With distinctively darker skins, curlier hair, etc it became easy -- as Western racial theories spread East -- to think of these darker people in racist terms. Very stubbornly, they insisted on speaking Malay, which had no filiation with the Thai languages and which the rulers almost never bothered to learn. They had also almost no state recognition, since the nominal head of the national Muslim community, appointed by the Thai monarch, was usually a Shia or residing in Bangkok and Thai-speaking. They experienced isolation, poverty, and often persecution. Furthermore, modern Bangkok has always had the bad habit of not dismissing from service cruel, incompetent, corrupt and stupid state officials, preferring to merely transfer them to remote and poor regions of which the Far South was the best example. You could say that administratively speaking, the Far South was like the toilet bowl of the state machinery. Furthermore, few Bangkok people think that hese conquered people have had anything to contribute to the modern nation, unlike the peoples of the North, the Northeast and the Mon.

Some years ago I described the real attitude of the Suharto dictatorship towards the resource rich provinces of Acheh and West Papua as: we don’t want the people, we just want the land and the resources. If they disappeared tomorrow, we wouldn’t miss them for one minute. There is something here that echoes with what I have said above. The special difficulty for Bangkok is however that the Far Southerners (except in Satun) not only carry a historical state-identity with them, but have substantial population bases, in a concentrated area, as far away from Bangkok as any part of the realm, and just next door to the Malay-controlled state of Malaysia, with a pretty porous border. They are also more and more aware of being part of a vast Muslim world across several continents, an awareness embedded in the ancient tradition of the hajj to Mecca. The educated sector is also aware of what I mentioned at the start of this talk, which is that the UN has plenty of members which are smaller in geographical size and lower in population than what is left of Old Pattani.

The Bangkok state’s own national myths make it impossible to recognize openly that the Far South does not really belong to Thailand in any strong way, or that it ‘owns’ the region out of simple conquest and a deal with London. Yet it is useful to remember that during World War II, it grabbed, with Japanese help, substantial parts of western Cambodia, northwestern Burma, and still more of the southern peninsula. But in 1945 the Allies forced Bangkok to give these new possessions up, and noe one cares today that they were lost. At the same time, Bangkok has no idea what to do with the Old Pattani, except to offer some minimal carrots and a lot more sticks. Bangkok has always thought that time is on its side, but the reality today suggests the opposite. The necessary minimum change would be real political and symbolic autonomy, but this would mean consciously and deliberately rectifying the mistakes of the much revered Rama V (who, when he visited the Muslim South never visited a single mosque). Yet the example of Malaysia itself is suggestive. It is still in many ways a stable federal state, in that all the old or not so old monarchies are still in place, and Malaysian Muslims, especially in rural areas, are attached to them. The state has ingeniously found a way to combine these loyalties with the nation-state by rotating the office of head of state among these small rajahs. Conversely, Rama V’s policy was to get rid of all local monarchies but his own, and it is still unthinkable today that this policy could be abandoned. My personal view on this matter that basically there is no Far South problem, but there is a huge Bangkok problem.

Group 3. The peoples in this group are in the worst position of all. Ineluctable population pressure from the flatland Thai, modern communications especially transportation, massive logging (and in the case of the Chao Le) high-tech commercial overfishing, military and police power available to Bangkok greater than ever before in history, mean that the old option of strategic retreat into more remote and difficult terrain has really vanished for good. These people are small in numbers, scattered in their habitats, and unsophisticated in modern means of social and political organization, hence they have few of what James Scott famously called ‘the weapons of the weak.’ Only a handful of them have reasonably good secondary, let alone tertiary education, and this elite can usually be coopted. Many of them face a special disadvantage which we can better understand by reminding ourselves that the most oppressed people in modern Europe, up until today, have been the Gypsies. The basic reason is that the age-old tradition of the Gypsies is nomadism, constant movement across state boundaries. All modern, and also mediveal states, have hated moving populations, because they are hard to monitor, to empress into armies, and to force to pay taxes.

If the people I have been talking about earlier would like better access to the Bangkok state, or dream about reviving their own old states, the people in group 3 for the most part have always been stateless peoples, and, most of the time, have been happy with their statelessness. But is just this statelessness that nationalist, Buddhist, monarchical Bangkok finds it impossible to imagine.Furthermore, no one but a scattering of Christian and Buddhist missionaries and anthropologists has any interest in Group 3’s languages or cultures.

How lowly they are regarded, and how little they are thought capable of contributing to the national identity is shown by characteristic state policies: a curious mix of charity, contempt, ignorance, indifference, and brutality. It is worth thinking about the historical fact that the only people within Thailand’s borders to have suffered napalm assaults from Bangkok have been the Hmong. It is thus probably typical that some of these Group 3 people find it difficult even to get the papers which would confirm that they are fellow-citizens of the rest of the country’s population. (In this context it should be noted that, partly because of Thailand’s strong monarchical traditions, the concept of citizenship is pretty weakly developed.) This is, for the peoples in Group 3, a pity, since anthopologists have shown us that they are much more egalitarian in their customs than the rest of the country.

In the longer run, in order to survive, they will have to make some bold adapations to the situation that they have a state, or perhaps better, a state has them. These adaptations will also have to be primarily political , though with social and cultural support. In effect they will have to make political noise, and also ally themselves with other people who are in the same boat. Whether Bangkok will listen to them, or have any creative ideas about how humanly to accomodate them is something for us all to think about very seriously.

Thank you!

SOUTH ASIA: Caste-based discrimination

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 22, 2008
ALRC-CWS-07-010-2008

A joint written statement submitted by the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC), Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Catholic Organization for Relief and Development (CORDAID), Minority Rights Group (MRG), Diakonisches Werk der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland, Anti-Slavery International, and International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR) to the 7th session of the Human Rights Council

SOUTH ASIA: Caste-based discrimination and analogous forms of inherited social exclusion: Discrimination based on work and descent (1)

The former Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution 2005/109, gave a mandate to the former Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to undertake a study on discrimination based on work and descent, and to develop draft principles and guidelines for the elimination of this form of discrimination. This was the first occasion on which the UN’s leading human rights body sought to address comprehensively the entrenched form of discrimination that affects, among others, the Dalits of South Asia, estimated to number more than 200 million people.

Three years later, the Sub-Commission experts entrusted with this mandate, Professor Yozo Yokota and Professor Chin-Sung Chung, have completed their task and sought to deliver a final report which includes the draft principles and guidelines widely anticipated by organizations representing affected communities around the world. However, with the abolition of the Sub-Commission, their painstaking work lacks a forum for its consideration and finalization, and has become caught in a transitional limbo. This situation points to a lacuna in the institution-building process in the Human Rights Council – the lack of clear transitional arrangements for the pending work of the Sub-Commission.

One of the key criteria for judging the success of the reform of the UN’s human rights architecture must surely be that the achievements of the Commission on Human Rights in promoting and protecting the human rights of the victims of violations around the world should at least not be undermined or neglected. But here is a clear case in which an entrenched system of discrimination which has led and continues to lead to some of the most egregious violations of the rights and freedoms of a significant proportion of humanity - and which the international human rights system has for far too long failed to propose a systemic response - risks being overlooked again.

Accordingly, the co-sponsors of this statement urge the creation of an appropriate procedure for the consideration and adoption of the final report submitted by Professors Yokota and Chung regarding discrimination based on work and descent, and for appropriate action on the draft principles and guidelines included in that report.

Making caste-based discrimination a priority on the agenda of the Human Rights Council as a serious contemporary human rights issue in Asia and the other parts of the world in which affected communities are found is an essential step for the realization of human rights for millions upon millions of the Earth’s most vulnerable and marginalized people. We are somewhat encouraged that the focus areas for the Asia-Pacific region outlined in the OHCHR’s Strategic Management Plan 2008-2009 are impunity, weak institutions and discrimination, all of which are key factors in contributing to the systematic discrimination against Dalits. More specifically, caste-based discrimination is mentioned as a specific human rights concern to be included in the OHCHR’s field of work in the next biennium.

The continuing salience of caste-based discrimination is well-attested to by a growing chorus of concluding observations and recommendations issued by multiple treaty bodies concerning affected countries, as well as by material submitted for the forthcoming examinations of several affected countries under the UPR mechanism.

The Human Rights Council has, appropriately, a special focus on implementation, and on improving the situation of the victims of human rights violations on the ground. The draft principles and guidelines developed by Professors Yokota and Chung can be a very important tool for fulfilling this responsibility to the more than 200 million people who still continue to struggle under crushing yoke of caste-based discrimination and analogous forms of inherited social exclusion. We call upon the Human Rights Council to take up this tool, and use it.

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Footnote:

(1) Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law; Dalit Network Netherlands; Dalit Solidarity Network, United Kingdom; and Justice and Peace Netherlands also share the views expressed in this statement.

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About the ALRC: The Asian Legal Resource Centre is an independent regional non-governmental organisation holding general consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It is the sister organisation of the Asian Human Rights Commission. The Hong Kong-based group seeks to strengthen and encourage positive action on legal and human rights issues at the local and national levels throughout Asia.

Asian Human Rights Commission19/F, Go-Up Commercial Building,998 Canton Road, Kowloon, Hongkong S.A.R.Tel: +(852) - 2698-6339 Fax: +(852) - 2698-6367

A great smacking sound

A great smacking sound

By Chang Noi

The Nation ,18 february 2008

The unmistakable sound heard over the last two weeks has been the simultaneous smack of many lips newly moistened by a saliva of expectancy after a long spell of drought.

There have been three general elections within three years. Elections Thai-style are expensive for candidates, for parties, and for patrons. There has been little time for recovery. On top, political chaos has disrupted budget spending. Under Thaksin rather few Cabinet posts went to MPs. Most were taken by outsiders. The Samak government is expected to be a welcome return to business as usual. Cabinet portfolios were shared among party financiers and the nominees of key faction heads in the time-honoured fashion.

Many newly anointed ministers were so overcome with excitement that they blurted out plans which have “gimme” written all them, even before they had got through the ministry door. Reverse compulsory licensing. Declare the eucalyptus tree an environmental marvel and plant thousands of hectares. Haul back the Bangkok mass-transit plans so that the specs can be changed and the whole bidding process restarted from scratch. Re-activate computer purchase schemes which are already mired in corruption charges. And refloat the irrigation fantasy which will require mega-volumes of earth moving, mega-kilometres of piping, and mega-tons of concrete without any popular demand or any calculable benefit.

If the landscape seems familiar that is because we have been here before, around a dozen years ago. No fewer than twelve of the current ministers or their nominators were members of the famous Cabinet of Banharn Silpa-archa. There is a photo of the heads of that coalition on the steps of Government House just after their alliance was formed. Samak, Thaksin, Banharn, Snoh, Sudarat, and Chalerm are all there. Banharn is trying to get them to link hands in the tableau popular at international conferences. But it isn’t really working. They look as if they don’t want to touch one another.

This similarity to the Banharn Cabinet signals a structural reversal too. This is a return to a government of small capital. Thaksin brought together a cabal of some of the biggest and most modernized corporate interests in Thailand. Several were directly represented in the Cabinet. Others were clustered close outside. Lesser businessfolk were excluded. The career path from local boss through MP to minister was suddenly disrupted. Over the last five years, several political families deserted national politics for the new and more accessible opportunities in local government. But now we are back to the old days. The tycoons are nowhere to be seen. The Cabinet is again the property of contractors, construction magnates, property dealers, and hauliers.

This means old-style feeding habits will return too. In the Thaksin era, the big corporations were less interested in crude old ways of looting the government budget. They collected their reward through increases in their profits or share prices brought about by government actions. This was sleek and even legal, most of the time. But we will be back now to the politics of loot, of padded estimates and percentage deductions.

There are two other reasons why the smacking of lips last week was especially enthusiastic and expectant. Both of these are gifts from the coup government, for which the new ministers should be truly grateful.

First, there is a lot of money around and a pressing need to spend it quickly. The coup ministers dedicated themselves to doing as little as possible. In truth, public investment has been low ever since the financial crisis over a decade ago. There is clear rationale for spending on public infrastructure and public goods of many kinds. The mega-projects have been dangling for three years, stymied by political conflict. There is money in the coffers and clear directions for spending it

Second, the total failure of the coup regime to nail anyone for corruption is an invitation to plunder with impunity. Recall that the coup regime made corruption one of its four key tasks. Look at the pitiful result.

The inability to catch big businesses for profiting through conflict of interest is perhaps not so surprising. But the total failure to prosecute anyone for the massive mining of Suvarnabhumi Airport is gob-smacking. The case over the CTX scanners has dissolved into thin air, even though it was reported months ago that the US Department of Justice had provided the names of those involved. Khunying Jaruvarn estimated that contracts were padded by 40 percent on average, but not one case has been launched. It is well established that King Power occupied far more retail space than its contract allowed, blocked safety exists, built a whole building without permission and without rental, and prejudiced airport security. Yet all attempts to bring the company to justice have been sandbagged. If these massive bits of plundering are safe from the law, then more modest piracy should be fine.

So it was not surprising that the first week of this government was dominated by a great smacking sound. And it was not surprising that the other sound of the week was a lot of snarling aimed at the media.

The old hands in this government will easily recall the problems which free media can cause. The press played a key role in exposing the multiple corruption which brought the Banharn government down after only sixteen months. The short period in the late 1990s when ITV was truly independent brought evidence of corruption to the attention of a wider swathe of the public than ever before. Thaksin’s government was doomed after it lost control of the media in mid 1995.

We can expect a return to the methods of controlling media used by the Banharn, Chavalit, and Thaksin governments: oversight, manipulation of advertising, and intimidation. Most of all, intimidation. Probably this time it will be faster and nastier. Chirmsak Pinthong was thrown off the airwaves by both Banharn and Thaksin, but this is the first time he lasted no more than a week.

Political psychosis, legal dementia and systemic abuses of human rights

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 22, 2008
ALRC-CWS-07-006-2008

A written statement submitted by the Asian Legal Resource Centre to the 7th session of the Human Rights Council

BURMA: Political psychosis, legal dementia and systemic abuses of human rights

1. In December 2007 the Asian Legal Resource Centre pointed out to the Sixth Session of the Human Rights Council (Resumed) that the manner of handling the September 2007 protests and subsequent detention without trial of large numbers of persons in Myanmar contrary to domestic as well as international law was not something exceptional in that country but rather a larger than usual manifestation of the long term decline in notions of legality and order that has occurred under successive military regimes there.

2. The ALRC in the same month had issued a special report describing this trajectory away from basic notions of legality and human rights as a consequence of "political psychosis and legal dementia". The study approached lawlessness as a symptom of an administrative and judicial system gone mad; a condition that impinges daily not only on the lives of those persons that are the subjects of typical human rights interventions and media interest, such as political leaders and prisoners of conscience, but of all persons everywhere within its borders. In the introduction to that study, it wrote that

"Dementia is a condition characterised by memory failures, personality changes, and impaired reasoning. All of these are evident in the handling of criminal cases in (Myanmar), and indeed, in the management of the state as a whole. All affairs that should be conditioned by a degree of rationality are instead haphazard, the result of impaired reasoning, lost memory and unpredictable changes in temperament." (article 2, vol. 6, no. 5-6)

3. Among those cases that the ALRC has documented in the months since the report that again speak to this condition are the following.

a. Paing Hpyo Aung was forcibly recruited into Light Infantry Battalion 346 based in Taunggut, Rakhine State, when he was 13, in violation of the Government of Myanmar’s commitments to eliminate the use of child soldiers. He was sent to serve in a frontline area, from where he absconded. He was tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment on 14 December 2005, when 15, violation of the Convention of the Rights of a Child, to which Myanmar is a State Party, and the country’s 1993 Child Law. He was held in Thandwe Prison and his family only found out about his whereabouts in late 2007, whereupon they lodged a complaint to seek his release. However, in response to their complaint, the local authorities have now intimidated the family and sought persons who helped them to make it. There is as yet no indication that Paing Hypo Aung will be released.

b. Htun Htun Naing, 31 (deceased), was jailed on a gambling offence and on 21 June 2006 taken from Insein Prison and sent to serve as a worker on a military operation under Infantry Battalion 250, based in Loikaw, Kayah State, in violation of domestic Order 1/99 and the Supplementary Order on forced labour. On 9 November 2006, Deputy Warrant Officer Aung Kyaw Htun visited his family and notified them that he had died of malaria on August 17. The officer did not give any documents to prove that he was dead or cause of death, such as a death certificate and medical report. However, he took the house register, victim’s national identity card and proof of residency document from the ward council office in order to process the case, and advised the family to go to the army battalion. But because of its distant location and the poverty of the family, they could not go. Thereafter, the family was shocked when notified in a document from the Ministry of Defence of 30 January 2007 that it had decided to award the family with 7200 Kyat in compensation, or about USD 5.75, for Htun Htun Naing’s death. Although the family has since requested that the case be reviewed and additional compensation be given, to date they are not known to have received anything further. Nor have they received documents to prove the death and circumstances of death.

4. These and numerous other cases documented by the ALRC are bound to one another by the systemic dementia in Myanmar’s judicial and political administration. However, when it comes to international discussion and the devising of responses to such abuses, the problem is that they are often divided, for convenience and perhaps out of habit, into discrete conventional categories of human rights discourse—i.e. child soldiers and forced labour. They are seen more in terms of their differences rather than their similarities, not only in defiance of notions of the universality of human rights, but also contrary to the commonality of their causes.

5. It is for this reason among others that a new approach to Myanmar is needed and that the Asian Legal Resource Centre is on this occasion reiterating its call for the Human Rights Council to spearhead the establishing of a special study and strategy group on Myanmar that will bring together representatives of all key concerned United Nations agencies in order to make a both detailed and comprehensive assessment that can draw together the disparate elements of the human rights, humanitarian and political crises there. The ALRC sincerely believes that the establishment of such a group would be met with very positive responses from many quarters and could quickly obtain information and make critical analyses with which to devise directed and effective interventions in both the short and long term.

6. Correct diagnosis is the first requirement for effective intervention. Where legal dementia and political insanity are not taken seriously and are treated as if they will go away with some mild curatives and gentle words, the condition can only get worse, as it has over the last decade in Myanmar. But when this happens, it is not only the country suffering from the malaise but also the third party, in this case the Human Rights Council, which is acting irrationally. To work effectively we must acknowledge what we are dealing with. The only way to do this is through proper study, assessment and action, which cannot come from half-hearted measures. The Council must do more for Myanmar than what it has done so far. The proposed study and strategy group would be an important and necessary step in the right direction.

# # #

About the ALRC: The Asian Legal Resource Centre is an independent regional non-governmental organisation holding general consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It is the sister organisation of the Asian Human Rights Commission. The Hong Kong-based group seeks to strengthen and encourage positive action on legal and human rights issues at the local and national levels throughout Asia.

Asian Human Rights Commission19/F, Go-Up Commercial Building,998 Canton Road, Kowloon, Hongkong S.A.R.Tel: +(852) - 2698-6339 Fax: +(852) - 2698-6367

rule of law & human rights in Thailand

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 22, 2008
ALRC-CWS-07-008-2008A written statement submitted by the Asian Legal Resource Centre to the 7th session of the Human Rights Council

THAILAND: Continued threats to rule of law & human rights under elected government

1. On February 9, the new prime minister of Thailand, Samak Sundaravej, made a number of startling statements before international television audiences that amounted not only to a denial of history but to an affront to the global human rights movement.

2. In an interview broadcast on CNN, he claimed that only “one unlucky guy” was beaten to death in a brutal rightwing militia attack at Thammasat University in Bangkok on 6 October 1976 in which over 40 were in fact confirmed dead; hundreds more went unaccounted for, an incident in which the Prime Minister has himself been implicated.

3. In another interview with Aljazeera, the Prime Minister repeated this claim and also denied that there had been anything wrong in the handling of a protest outside the Tak Bai police station in Narathiwat on 25 October 2004 in which over 85 persons died; 78 of them in army custody: an incident regarding which the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions had expressed his serious concern and sought unsuccessfully to visit Thailand. The Prime Minister claimed that the Tak Bai victims had “just fall(en) on each other” due to weakness caused by fasting during Ramadan, when it is known from video footage and the findings of staff from the Central Institute of Forensic Science, which have been presented at an ongoing inquest into the deaths, that most died as a result of asphyxiation after being packed on top of each other in trucks.

4. These shamelessly and patently false remarks are indicative of the continued decline in respect for human rights, principles of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Thailand that were slowly being built up during the previous decade but were eroded under the former government of Pol. Lt. Gen. Thaksin Shinawatra and then frontally attacked by the coup of General Sonthi Boonyaratglin in September 2006.

5. Despite the return of an elected government, it cannot be said that Thailand is now moving away from autocratic rule.

6. The military regime made a vast number of administrative and superficially legal changes during the time that it was in power in order to ensure that the armed forces and elite bureaucracy will have dominant roles in the government through the foreseeable future. These include the reassembling of the Internal Security Operations Command and moving of vast sums of money into parts of the military without any accountability; introduction of a National Security Law and a host of other repressive measures; and, downsizing of the National Human Rights Commission and appointing, rather than electing, of half of the Senate under the new 2007 Constitution, which was only passed through a referendum by less than 60 percent of the population, despite enormous funds and effort spent on Yes vote campaigns, and constant harassment of its opponents.

7. The coup group’s abrogating of the 1997 Constitution, the only genuinely constitutionalist charter that Thailand has had in its history, and the recent comments of the Prime Minister are in fact parts of the same anti-human rights approach to government and social control that trivialise notions of crime and law to the perceived advantage of powerful sections of society as against the overwhelming majority of the population.

8. Where gross offences such as the 1976 massacre and Tak Bai killings are not treated as crimes, impunity is guaranteed and the notions of law upon which the defence of human rights depends are made meaningless. The fair operation of law becomes less and less visible. Criminal prosecution is reduced to a legal ritual that for the most part is performed only against the poorest and least powerful. The concept of abuse of power is lost altogether.

9. Where constitutions are displaced, removed and replaced at will by military dictators and persons acting at their behest the consequences are the same. The displacement of constitutional law affects public law. Citizens’ rights to challenge government actions depend upon constitutional protections. Where these are repeatedly altered, as they are in Thailand, the practical use of the law and courts to defend human rights are undermined. People, including legal professionals, become confused and over time lose interest and confidence in the capacity of lawyers and judges to protect their interests as against those of the executive.

10. The practical implications of this trend can be understood with reference to two among a number of serious crimes allegedly committed by police in Thailand and reported during the first months of 2008.

a. In January, three men were found shot dead in Ayutthaya Province, just north of Bangkok, apparently after the police had captured them. The three, Akkharapol “Bank” Sampao, 22; Mongkol Yatra, 20, and Nakhon Kwaenkhetgun, 18, were wanted for the killing of three officers in a shootout on December 31 when police had come to arrest Akkhrapol at a relative’s home. Akkharapol’s family had negotiated with the police for their surrender, and had made a deal that they would hand themselves over at Ban Nong Lai in Phetchabun on January 9. Instead, the three men disappeared suddenly from a restaurant in Phetchabun that day and were found dead, all shot in the back, on a road in Uthai district the following morning. The police claim to know nothing and say that it was a case of “killing to cut the link” between criminals; the family believes that it was revenge.

b. At least 14 Border Patrol Police have so far been arrested, have surrendered or are wanted for allegedly abducting and torturing people for ransom and in order to fabricate cases. The police had brought their victims to Bangkok and held them in an apartment there. They were arrested after a woman whom they had held with her children reported what had happened to her. Since then, over 60 other persons have lodged similar complaints and at least 180 people who are currently in jail have sought to get their cases reviewed. The types of torture allegedly performed by the group include electrocution, including of a pregnant woman, beatings and extended periods of hooding. The alleged ringleader, Pol. Capt. Nat Chonnithiwanit, has defended himself by saying that he was only doing his job and that senior officers knew of his unit’s activities.

11. These, along with numerous other cases that the Asian Legal Resource Centre has documented and that have been reported in the media, speak to the same problems of abuse of power, failed constitutionalism and declining rule of law that are inherent in the current administration of Thailand as well as its predecessors. Where army generals overturn constitutions at will and heads of government openly deny that gross abuses of human rights have ever occurred, such killings, abductions and torture by state agents are guaranteed.

12. In light of the above, the Asian Legal Resource Centre calls for

a. Condemnation of the international human rights and diplomatic communities of the recent remarks by the Prime Minister of Thailand and calls for him to issue apologies to the victims of the 1976 massacre and Tak Bai killings.

b. Prompt investigations and prosecutions of the three army officers identified by a government-appointed commission as responsible for the deaths at Narathiwat in 2004.

c. The repeated requests of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial killings to be allowed to visit Thailand to be acknowledged and for an invitation to be extended without any further delay.

d. Investigation, arrest and prosecution of all police and other state officers alleged to have been responsible for abductions, killings, torture and other gross abuses of human rights in Thailand, including those implicated in the recent killings in Ayutthaya and the Border Patrol Police conspiracy, along with disciplinary action against their superiors, and the granting of protection to victims and witnesses in accordance with the Witness Protection Act (2003) and payment of compensation in accordance with the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act (2001).

e. The setting up of an independent civilian body to investigate complaints filed against law enforcement officials and ensure that there be prompt and effective remedies to allow detainees to challenge the legality of their detention, in accordance with the recommendations of the Human Rights Committee in 2005 (CCRP.CO.84.THA).

f. The establishing of legal measures to ensure command responsibility in cases of human rights abuses by police, soldiers and paramilitaries so that senior officers are also held responsible for the acts and omissions of their subordinates.

13. The enormous obstacles to the building of an authentic respect for human rights in Thailand are deeply connected to the long-term denial of the rule of law and genuine constitutionalism there. While measures such as these will not go so far as to displace these obstacles, they are integral if any progress is to be made towards this goal.

# # #About the ALRC:

The Asian Legal Resource Centre is an independent regional non-governmental organisation holding general consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It is the sister organisation of the Asian Human Rights Commission. The Hong Kong-based group seeks to strengthen and encourage positive action on legal and human rights issues at the local and national levels throughout Asia.

Asian Human Rights Commission19/F, Go-Up Commercial Building,998 Canton Road, Kowloon, Hongkong S.A.R.Tel: +(852) - 2698-6339 Fax: +(852) - 2698-6367

Thailand : protecting witnesses and victims

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 20, 2008
AHRC-OLT-004-2008

An Open Letter to the Minister of Justice of Thailand by the Asian Human Rights Commission

Sompong AmornvivatMinister of JusticeOffice of the Ministry of JusticeMinistry of Justice Building22nd Floor, Software Park Building,Chaeng Wattana RoadPakkred, NonthaburiBangkok 11120THAILAND
Fax: +662 502 6699/ 6734 / 6884Tel: +662 502 6776/ 8223

Dear Mr. Sompong

THAILAND: Police must under no circumstances be given responsibility for protecting witnesses from other police

The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) is writing to you today to express grave concern regarding information it has received that witnesses and victims in cases where the police are the alleged perpetrators are from the end of the month to be offered protection by police rather than officers under your Ministry.

According to the information we have received, Angkhana Neelaphaijit, the wife of abducted human rights lawyer Somchai Neelaphaijit, will from February 29 no longer receive protection from personnel assigned by the Department of Special Investigation, Ministry of Justice. Instead, the Department will give police officers the task. Likewise, at least three victims of alleged police torture and the grandmother of a man allegedly abducted and killed by the police are also to have police officers take responsibility for their protection, instead of departmental staff.

The AHRC is alarmed by this proposal to transfer protection duties in these cases to police personnel, as it would defeat the entire purpose of the witness protection programme set up by your ministry in accordance with the Witness Protection Act BE 2546 (2003).

The Witness Protection Act of Thailand, introduced through the now abrogated Constitution of BE 2540 (1997), was a welcome initiative because although it recognised the importance of offering protection and also for the first time acknowledged that it should not be the responsibility of police to protect victims and witnesses of serious crimes, paving the way for an Office of Witness Protection under your Ministry. This was all the more important in Thailand in view of the fact that it is the police themselves who stand accused of a great many grave offences, including widespread acts of killing, torture and forced disappearance.

However, as you are aware, that Office has few staff and funds with which to carry out its activities and thus it falls to other agencies to take the actual responsibility for protecting witnesses. Unfortunately, this already results in unsatisfactory arrangements where police officers are assigned responsibility for protecting people against other police officers.

Unsurprisingly, witnesses are unwilling to have police protect them from other police, even where they are not from the same units or regional command, as has sometimes been the case. However, they have little choice other than to either accept protection from persons upon whom they cannot rely for their security, or be left to fend for themselves.

Defence of human rights and upholding of law depends upon strong witness protection. Witnesses and victims need to be reassured that they and their families will not face reprisals before, during and after trial. Without this much, they will not cooperate. If they do not cooperate, a trial is made into a travesty. If large numbers of people do not cooperate, there is no administration of justice.

Clearly, both the Act and the work of the Office need to be strengthened greatly in order to expand the work of non-police agencies in protecting witnesses and victims in Thailand. It is thus very disturbing to hear that the opposite is happening and that these small steps in the right direction are already being reversed.

The Asian Human Rights Commission thus calls upon you to ensure that:

a. Angkhana Neelaphaijit and other witnesses and victims of alleged crimes committed by the police continue to receive protection from personnel under the Ministry of Justice, not the Royal Thai Police or agencies closely linked to the police.

b. The work of the Office of Witness Protection under your Ministry is strengthened by increased funding and personnel and arrangements for it to play a stronger role in the handling of cases where parties are in need of protection than it has at present, and sufficient personnel and funds also be given to agencies such as the Department of Special Investigation to carry out protection work.

c. Clear guidelines are laid down so that cases where police are the accused under absolutely no circumstances other police are given responsibility for protecting witnesses and victims.
d. The Witness Protection Act is amended to give coverage to a wider range of persons, including defendants in criminal cases.

We trust that you will be concerned to ensure that nothing happens to these victims and witnesses as a result of a rash and wrong decision on the part of the Department of Special Investigation to have police officers assigned as protection officers in cases that are its responsibility, not the responsibility of the police, for the very reason that the police cannot be trusted to handle them. We expect you will ensure that police are not assigned duties on these or any other human rights cases of this sort, and that you will be keen to see the witness protection responsibilities of your Ministry further expanded rather than undermined through such short-sighted actions.

In order to assist you in this regard, we enclose a copy of a report on witness protection in Thailand that was published in 2006 by our sister organisation, the Asian Legal Resource Centre, which is also available in both Thai and English online:

http://www.article2.org/mainfile.php/0503/

Yours sincerely

Basil Fernando

Executive DirectorAsian Human Rights Commission, Hong Kong

Cc:
1. Samak Sundaravej, Prime Minister, Thailand
2. Noppadon Pattama, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
3. Pol. Maj. Chalerm Yoobumrung, Minister of Interior, Thailand
4. Sunai Manomai-udom, Director General, Department of Special Investigation, Thailand
5. Chaikasem Nitisiri, Attorney General, Thailand
6. Professor Saneh Chamarik, Chairperson, National Human Rights Commission, Thailand
7. Vasant Panich, Chairperson, Subcommittee on Legislation and Administration of Justice, National Human Rights Commission, Thailand
8. Dej-Udom Krairit, President, Lawyers Council of Thailand
9. Homayoun Alizadeh, Regional Representative for Asia-Pacific of OHCHR

Asian Human Rights Commission19/F, Go-Up Commercial Building,998 Canton Road, Kowloon, Hongkong S.A.R.Tel: +(852) - 2698-6339 Fax: +(852) - 2698-6367

History lessons

History lessons

By Post Reporters

Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej locked horns with the Democrat Party yesterday over his role in shutting down newspapers when he was interior minister in the wake of the Oct 6, 1976 student uprising at Thammasat University.

Mr Samak denied any links to the massacre of student protesters and denied he had a role in silencing the media. Instead, he said, he was the one who pushed for the newspapers to reopen.

During the debate on the government's policies in parliament yesterday, Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, as leader of the opposition, called on the government to respect the media's role in monitoring the government.

Mr Abhisit spoke of the time when Mr Samak was interior minister in the coup government which came to power in the wake of the Oct 6 massacre.

"During that period a lot of newspapers were ordered closed," Mr Abhisit said.

The present government must make sure nothing similar would happen again.

Mr Abhisit said ways of interfering with the media at that time, such as closing newspapers, were different.

Today, meddling with the media was more subtle, such as applying pressure on media organisations and making them fear their business would suffer if they continue to heap criticism on those in power.

Mr Abhisit also wondered why the promise of freedom to information on government organisations and other public media was omitted from the government's policy.

He touched on the spat involving Prime Minister's Office Minister Jakrapob Penkair and outspoken former senator Chirmsak Pinthong, whose radio programme was pulled off the air.

Mr Abhisit said Mr Chirmsak should be allowed to do his duty of presenting the facts. His show on FM 105 was axed after airing evidence to counter claims by Mr Samak that only one demonstrator died during the Oct 6, 1976 uprising.

Mr Samak made the comment during a recent interview with CNN and repeated it to a reporter from Al Jazeera TV.

Mr Chirmsak accused Mr Jakrapob of pressuring Fatima Broadcasting International, the Public Relations Department's concessionaire, to end the show.

Mr Abhisit wondered whether the company acted because it was afraid of the government. If the government believed in freedom of the press, it should let Mr Chirmsak return to host the show.

In response, Mr Samak insisted that he did not order the closure of newspapers when he was appointed interior minister immediately after the uprising. He contended he did exactly the opposite,sitting on a five-member committee set up "to open newspapers" on the orders of the National Administration Reform Council, which staged the coup following the massive civil unrest. He said:

"I was the one who pushed for the reopening of newspapers that were closed. I disagreed with the newspaper closures," Mr Samak said.

He pointed out he was not the interior minister at the time of the uprising. He took the job on Oct 22, 1976 and was never linked to the violent suppression of the student movement on Oct 6.

"I swear that I did not have any links to the Oct 14 [quashing of the democracy uprising in 1973] and Oct 6 incidents."

At one point in his speech, Mr Samak indicated that Mr Abhisit, as the opposition leader, was too young and may not have enough experience.

He said Mr Abhisit might not have full information about events of Oct 6 and suggested he ask Democrat chief adviser Chuan Leekpai to brief him.

Mr Chuan responded:

"Mr Samak should accept the fact that when the Oct 6 coup took place, newspapers were closed although they were allowed to reopen later."


Source : Bangkokpost, Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Women to get choice of Mrs, Miss

Women to get choice of Mrs, Miss

From the middle of this year, married women, divorcees and widows will be allowed to decide whether they want to be addressed as Miss or Mrs.

Published on February 8, 2008

The legislation relating to women's titles will take effect from June 4, according to Suchit Tripitak, deputy director-general of the Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development.

"The legislation was announced in the Royal Gazette on February 5 and will be enforced 120 days after the announcement, which falls on June 4," he said.

"Since we want women to have equal rights with men, they should be able to choose the title they want. In the next four months, women's titles will identify only their gender, not their marital status as in the past."

Meanwhile, a draft bill that would allow people to change their titles after undergoing a sex change operation was not passed by the previous legislature, the National Legislative Assembly.

"Some contents of the draft bill have been found to affect other acts, for instance the Civil Registration Act. We have to discuss the effects on other acts to adjust appropriate details in the draft before we submit it to the new government for consideration," Suchit said.


Wannapa Phetdee

The Nation

Three big pirates

Three big pirates

Washington - A US-based industry group demanded the government focus more closely on intellectual property violations in Thailand. But the big surprise was the group's new Big Three of world IP scofflaws: Russia, China - and Canada.

Eric Smith, president of the International Intellectual Property Alliance, urged that Thailand be placed on the "priority watch list" by the US Trade Representative, along with old-time pirates Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, India, Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine.

But then, for his second surprise, he asked for the addition of 10 other brand-new countries on the lower "watch list," a move which would bring that list to 29: Spain, Greece, Sweden, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Brunei, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Kazakhstan.

The USTR releases its annual list at the end of April.

Later this week, Thailand is to submit evidence that officials hope will convince the United States that Thailand has improved its record on piracy.

Puangrat Aswapisit told reporters last week that Thailand will submit evidence by Friday to try to move the country off the US priority watch list. It was elevated to that list last year, when US officials said that Thailand had arrested only a few major violators of US copyrights and trademarks.

Puangrat would not comment when asked about rumours that the United States plans to downgrade Thailand even more. If Thailand were listed as a "priority foreign country," the United States might impose economic sanctions.

But few believe the US will take that action, given the country's return to democracy. It is more likely Thailand will receive at least another year on the priority list.

The IIPA report on Monday said that Thailand last year recorded "mixed results in copyright protection and enforcement."

"Notwithstanding the recent efforts of the Thai Government, high levels of piracy persist and continue to claim victims."

On one hand, there were a number of raids on malls and other sales areas. But rampant piracy continued, and, " The book publishing industry, in particular, reports a disturbing surge of exports of high quality academic and professional books."

The big surprise on Monday was the addition of next-door neighbour Canada to the IIPA criticism. Lumping it with serial violators Russia and China as one of the Big Three pirates was surprising.

According to Smith, US business software companies lost an estimated $511 million in sales last year in Canada because of piracy, up from $494 million in 2006,

One-third of the business software used in Canada in 2007 was an illegal copy, down just 1 percentage point from the previous year, the group said.

Also, 10 years after signing World Intellectual Property Organization treaties extending copyright protections to the Internet, Canada still has taken “no meaningful steps toward modernizing its copyright law to meet the global minimum standards,” the group said.

The industry coalition said it “conservatively” estimates that US companies lost at least $30 billion to $35 billion in sales around the world in 2007.

China again led the list with estimated lost sales in that market of $2.98 billion, from $2.43 billion in 2006. US business software companies suffered the biggest piracy losses — $2.47 billion — the group said.

However, US recording industry losses in China more than doubled in 2007 to $451-million, as the market share for pirated music rose to 90 per cent.

“Online and mobile piracy have become huge problems with China's Internet-connected population having reached 210 million at the end of 2007 and with over 500 million mobile devices in the marketplace,” the group said.

Russia, as part of its negotiations to join the World Trade Organization, signed an agreement with the United States in November 2006 pledging action to reduce piracy.

More than one year later, Russia has not fully implemented that pact and the country's copyright piracy problem “remains one of the most serious in the world. Piracy rates for some sectors continues at over 70 per cent in 2007,” the group said.

However, total losses in Russia fell last year to an estimated $1.43 billion, from $1.96 billion in 2006.

Source : Bangkokpost, Tue, February 12, 2008